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KEITH NJ. CARLSON and ROGER W. SPENCER
OES Government spending displace a near equal
amount of private spending? This notion, popularly
known as the “crowding- out” effect of Government
expenditures, has recently gained wide-spread at-
tention at two levels. Fii-st, at the policy level, public
officials have expressed concern, that massive current
and projected Federal deficits will have a deleterious
effect on private capital expenditures for some time
to come. Second, at the academic level, “crowding
out” is at least one of the issues which helps to dis-
tinguish between followers of the t\vo major macro-
economic schools of thought Keynesians and
monetarists.
This article focuses on “crowding out” from more
of an academic than a practical policy point of view.
Policy implications can he drawn from this discus-
sion, but, for the most part, the abstract economic
models used in academic circles are not easily adapt-
able to observable phenomena. Yet the origins of the
recent crowding—out controversy at the academic
level are traceable to certain empirical results based
on U.S. experience.
New research has been conducted in this area and
some old arguments have been revived.1 Many of
the developments in the crowding-out controversy
°The authors acknowledge the helpful comments of James
Barth, William Dewald, Dean Dutton, Thomas l-lavrilesky,
Robert Rasehe, Paul Smith, Frank Steindi, and William Yohe,
none of whom should be held responsible for remaining
errors.
IFor a survey that includes a discussion of the views of the
classical economists on crowdmg out, Sec Roger \V. Spencer
aad William P. Yohe, “The ‘Crowding Out’ of Private Ex-
penditures by Fiscal Policy Actions,” this Review (October
1970), pp. i2-24.
can be described in the context of the standard
IS-LM analytic framework, In this framework, which
is the cornerstone of most macroeconomics courses
taught throughout the western world, the IS curve
represents the locus of points (pairs of interest rates
and real income) in \vhich the real sector of the
economy is in equilibrium, and the LM curve repre-
sents a similar locus of points for which the demand
for money equals the supply. The IS-Ui apparatus
has distinct limitations, hut because of its widespread
use as a pedagogical device, it serves a useful func-
tion in highlighting the issues in the crowding-out
controversy.2
The subject of crowding out is approached by first
investigating a number of separate “cases” which pro-
vide various explanations of how crowding out might
occur. Next, the role of stability considerations in the
controversy is assessed. Finally, several econometric
models~~tre examined to determine what empirical
implications they have for the crowding-out issue.
To set the stage for the discussion, two matters
of a preliminary nature are taken up in this section.
First, crowding out is defined for the purposes at
hand. Much of the recent discussion of crowding out
has been confusing simply because the term has not
been carefully defined. Second, since the controversy
2
For discussion of the limitations of the IS-LM framework,
see Karl Brunner and Allan II. \ leltzer, “Monetanism ‘lie
Pri cipal Issties Areas of Agreei ient a 11(1 tllv Work Remain—
aig.’’ \JotietOitsoi, ed. 3 eroilie L, Stein, ( Ainsterdam North
Hollaiirl Publishing Co., forthcoming), and ‘Mr. Hicks and
the Monetarists, Ecoao,aica (Febmary 1973), pp. 44-59.
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has moved through several stages in recent years and
has oftentimes involved complex and subtle argu-
ments, an overview is provided as a guide to the
reader,
Crowding out generally refers to the economic ef-
fects of expansionary fiscal actions. If an increase in
Government demand, financed by either taxes or
debt issuance to the public, fails to stimulate total
economic activity, the private sector is said to have
been ‘crowded out” by the Government action. The
presumption of a constant money supply insures that
the policy action accompanying the increase in Gov-
ernment demand is fiscal and not monetary.
The analysis may be conducted in either real or
nominal terms. The crowding-out hypothesis main-
tains that if prices are held constant, as in typical
IS-LM fashion, an increase in real Government de-
mand financed by real taxes or debt has no lasting
effect on real income. Alternatively, crowding out
implies that an increase in Government spending,
given flexible prices and a constant money supply,
has no lasting effect on nominal income. In other
words, the steady state Government spending multi-
plier, under the ahove conditions, is approximately
zero.3
By approximately zero, we mean that increased
Government demand may crowd out exactly the
same amount of private demand, slightly less, or
slightly more. There is complete crowding out if $1
of Government demand displaces $1 of private de-
mand, partial crowding out if $1 of Government
demand displaces less than $1 of private demand,
and over crowding out if $1 of Government demand
displaces more than $1 of private demand. The in-
creased Government demand may increase aggregate
demand temporarily, permanently, or not at all, as
will be explained below.
The origins of the recent controversy are traceable
primarily to the empirical results published by Ander-
sen and Jordan in 1968 and supporting studies by
Keran in 1969 and 1970.~These results indicated
3
These definitional issues are explored in more tletail in the
appendix.
~Leonall C. Andersen and Jerry L. Jordan, “Monetary and
Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their Relative Importance in
Economic Stabilization,” this Review (November 1968), pp.
11-24; Michael W. Keran, “Monetary and Fiscal Influences
that nominal crowding out occurs; that is, a change
in Federal spending financed by either horrowing or
taxes has only a negligible effect on GNP over a
period of about a year, These studies did not suggest
that expansionary fiscal actions have no effect, but
showed instead that the initial effect, which is posi-
tive, is followed in later quarters by an approximately
off-setting negative effect.
The response to these empirical results took place
at two levels — statistical and theoretical. At the
statistical level, the validity of the results was ques-
tioned. Were proper statistical procedures followed
in their derivation?5 On the theoretical level the ques-
tion was whether or not the results were consistent
with what seemed to be the accumulated evidence
on certain theoretical propositions.°
Although all the returns regarding the validity of
the Andersen-Jordan empirical procedures are not
yet in, this article focuses on the theoretical argu-
ments that have since evolved. The first theoretical
argument offered in response to the crowding out
concept was an alleged inconsistency between such
results and the prevailing estimates of the interest
elasticity of the demand for money.7 The critics
charged, on the basis of the IS-LM framework, that
in order for crowding out to occur, the proponents
of these results must be assuming that the demand
for money is nearly perfectly interest-inelastic, This
allegation meant acceptance of the proposition that
the LM curve is essentially vertical. According to the
critics, most empirical estimates do not support a zero
interest elasticity of money demand.
In answer to this charge of inconsistency, Milton
Friedman and others argued that the slope of the
LM curve was largely irrelevant to the crowding out
on Economic Activity — The Historical Evidence,” this Re-
view (November 1969), pp. 5-24, and “Monetary and Fiscal
Jillluerices on Economic Activity: The Foreign Experience,”
this Review (February 1970), pp. 16-28.
5
See E. Gerald Corrigan, “The Measurement arid importance
of Fiscal Policy Changes,” Federal Reserve Bank of New
York Monthly Rev-Jew (June 1970), pp. 133-45; Richard C.
Davis, “How Much Does Money Matter? A Look at Some
Recent Evidence,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Monthly Review (June 1969), pp. 111-31; and Edward M.
(;raimi]ieh, “The Usefulness of Monetary and Fiscal Policy
as Discretionary Stabilization Tools,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking (May 1971), pp. 506-32.
6
James Tobio, “Friedman’s Theoretical Framework,” Journal
of Political Economy (September/October 1972), pp. 852-63;
Warren L. Smith, “A Neo~KeynesianView of Monetary Pol-
icy,” l”ederal Reserve Bank of Boston, Controlling Monetary
Aggregates (June 1969), pp. 105-26; and Ronald L. Teigen,
“A Critical Look at Monetarist Econonucs,” this Review
(January 1972), pp. 10-25.
Tobiii, “Friedman’s Theoretical Framework.”
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discussion.5 In particular, Friedman pointed out the
necessity of distinguishing between initial and subse-
quent effects of fiscal actions. According to Friedman,
an “expansionary” fiscal action might first be reflected
in a rise in output, but the financing of the deficit
would set in motion contractionary forces which
could eventually offset the initial stimulative effectY
In response to the Friedman explanation, the crit-
ics developed still another argument, again pointing
out an alleged inconsistency. This time the critics
attempted to demonstrate that the Friedman argu-
ment, which stemmed from explicit consideration of
the Government’s financing requirements, is not con-
sistent with generally accepted assumptions concern-
ing stability of the economic system (as represented
by the IS-LM apparatus).1° In particular, a debt-
financed increase in Government spending in a world
where crowding out occurs does not set in motion a
set of forces that will drive the IS-LM model to a
new equilibrium once it is disturbed from an initial
equilibrium.
All of these arguments are reviewed in some detail
in this article, Several alternative explanations are
offered as to how crowding out might occur regard-
less of the slope of the LM curve. A number of
shortcomings of the recently advanced arguments
based on stability analysis arc discussed. Finally,
returning to the empirical level, the results of some
well-known econometric models are examined to see
what light they shed on the crowding-out controversy.
Until recently, it was suggested by a number of
analysts that contemporary monetarists view the
8
Milton Friedman, “Comments on the Critics,” Journal of
Political Economy (September/October 1972), pp. 906-50;
and Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, “Money, Debt, and
Economic Activity,” Journal of Political Economy (Septem-
ber/October 1972), pp. 951-77.
°Forfurther discussion of the role of the Government financ-
ing constraint, see Spencer and Yohe, “The ‘Crowding Out’
of Private Expenditures;” Cad F. Christ, “A Short-Run Ag-
gregate-Demand Model of the Interdependence and Effects
of Monetary and Fiscal Policies with Keynesian and Classical
Interest Elasticities,” The American Economic Review (May
1967), pp. 434-43, and “A Simple Macroeconomic Model
with a Government Budget Restraint,” Journal of Politi-
cal Economy (January/February 1968), pp. 53-67; and Wil-
liam L. Sitber, “Fiscal Policy in JS-LM Analysis: A Correc-
tion,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (November
1970), pp. 461-72.
iOAlan S. Blinder and Robert M. Solow, “Does Fiscal Policy
Matter?” Journal of Public Economics (November 1973),
pp. 319-37; and James Tobin and Willem Buiter, “Long
vertical LM curve as a requirement for the existence
of crowding out. James Tobin, for example, observed
that a vertical LM curve leads to the “characteristic
monetarist” proposition that “a shift of the IS locus,
whether due to fiscal policy or to exogenous change
in consumption and investment behavior, cannot alter
~“,h1 William Branson, in his popular macroeconomics
textbook, notedthat
The monetarist position is that the interest elastici-
ties of the demand for and supply of money are
zero, so that the LM curve is vertical, In this case
fiscal policy changes the composition, but not the
level of national output, while monetary policy, shift-
ing a vertical LM curve, can change the level of
output. 12
Similar statements can be found in other texts.
This classical case of crowding out is examined in
some detail because of its presumed importance in
the crowding-out discussion. Following discussion of
this classical case, several alternative explanations
are offered as to how crowding out can occur in the
IS-LM framework, even if the interest elasticity of
money demand is not zero.
In order for Government spending to stimulate
economic activity, it must either foster increases in
the money stock (however defined) or increases in
the rate at which the existing money stock turns over.
Because the former possibility does not involve net
debt purchases by the private sector or increases in
taxes, there is no reason to think that private spend-
ing would be crowded out. However, if the money
stock does not increase, Government spending must
be financed by debt issuance or increased tax rev-
enue, either of which could result in a reduction in
private spending. If private spending is not curbed
by such actions, total spending rises, which implies
a rise in velocity — the rate at which the money stock
turns over.
Run Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy en Aggregate
Demand,” Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 384
(December 13, 1974).
IlTobin, “Friedman’s Theoretical Framework,” p, 853.
IOV/illiam H. Branson, Macroeconomic Thcory and Policy
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), p. 281. It is
of interest to note that Tobbi labels the case in which only
monetary policy can affect income as characteristically mon-
etarist arid the situation in which both monetary and fiscal
policies can alter income as characteristically oeo-Keynesian.
l3ranson symmetrically views the vertical LM case as
“extreme” monetarist, and the vertical IS case as “extreme
mien—Keynesian (or “fiscalist”).
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The LM curve is vertical (drawn for a given price
level, P,) in the classical case, reflecting a zero inter-
est elasticity of the demand for (and supply of)
money. Thus, an increase in Government spending
which shifts the IS curve to the right can only in-
crease the interest rate, but does not stimulate veloc-
ity. Consequently, aggregate demand, as shown in
the bottom half of Figure 1, does not shfft.ia One or
more components of private spending are crowded
out by an amount equal to the amount of the Govern-
ment spending increase, As a result, with aggregate
demand failing to shift in response to the increase
in Government spending, crowding out occnrs in both
realand nominalterms.
John
Maynard Keynes in 1936 provided the thrust for the
proposition that Government spending does not crowd
out private spending in his landmark book, The Gen-
eral Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.14
It is ironic that certain passages in that book provide
strong support for the opposite contention.
Keynes, throughout his General Theory, was much
concerned with expectations and confidence. He did
not overlook the possibility, even in those times of
relatively small budget deficits, that Government
l
3
Althomigh shown as a straight line, the true spirit of the
classical ease would be better preserved if aggregate de-
mand were drawn as a rectangular hyperbola.
-iJulso Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employ—
macnt, Interest and Money (New York: Hareourt, Brace and




spending could adversely affect the confidence of the
private sector in its economic future.
With the confused psychology which often prevails,
the Government programme may, through its effect
on ‘confidence’, increase liquidity-preference or di-
minish the marginal efficiency of capital, which,
again, may retard other investment unless measures
are taken to offset it.
15
An induced increase in liquidity preference, subse-
quent to an increase in Government spending from
C to C1, is depicted in the IS-LM franiework (see
Figure 2) by a leftward shift of the LM curve, and a
diminished marginal efficiency of investment schedule
is reflected by the subsequent backward shift of the
iSIbid., p. 120. For an algebraic analysis that takes into ac-
count some of the relevant aspects of this Keynes case, see
Richard J. Cebula, “Deficit Spending, Expectations, and
Fiscal Policy Effectiveness,” Public Finance (3-4/1973), pp.
362-70.
It is an axiom of classical economics that velocity
is virtually constant and cannot be increased by
Government actions. In particular, the rise in interest
rates, which is associated with the issuance of Gov-
ernment debt, does not induce the private sector to
attempt to hold less money balances because the
demand for money is not sensitive to interest rate
changes. This idea can be illustrated graphically




Five cases are presented which represent eco-
nomic situations conducive to Government displace-
ment of private spending without the requirement of
a vertical LM curve. The architects of these frame-
works range from such disparate figures as the Chi-
cago economists, Frank Knight and Milton Friedman,
to John Maynard Keynes.
AD
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IS curve to the position denoted as IS(G1), If these
shifts in the IS and LM curves result in 110 change
in aggregate demand at the given price level P0, both
nominal and real crowding out will occur. Flowever,
the actual shift in aggregate demand could be posi-
tive, negative, or negligible, depending on the rela-
tive shifts of the IS and LM curves.
A number of analysts have recently invoked the
Keynes case to explain the sluggishness of capital
expenditures in recent years. They, however, are not
the first since Keynes to attribute lackluster invest-
mnent plans to stepped-up Government spending. Dc-
scribing a situation with some similarities to the
present, Daniel Throop Smnith observed (in 1939)
that:
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A continued experience with deficits which do not
produce sustained recovery, as in this country, or a
recent inflation and collapse, as in continental Eu-
ropean countries, is likely to make a deficit a matter
for concern and anxiety. And, if there is disbelief in
the benefits of a deficit, then the new money spent
by the government may well be more timan offset by
additional withdrawals of private money which
would otherwise be spent. Likewise, if consumer in-
comes do increase immediately as a result of the def-
icit, business may anticipate that the increase is tem-
porary and refrain from long-term commitments.t°
iPtr he-/’hi ( rn-,e: -~ Ij’-1’-tz~’teei /~(tic-,-,. TMs
case is constructed on the basis of the writings of
Frank Knight,” The analysis does not do justice to
the complex theories of Knight, but is offered as being
roughly consistent with the spirit of his theory of
capital and interest.18 Though Knight certainly did
not conduct his analysis within an IS-LM framework,
an attempt is made to translate his ideas into such
terms.
According to Knight, we should expect no dimin-
ishing returns from investment. One reason for a
nearly perfectly interest-elastic investment function
is that the quantity of capital is so large relative to
the additions to it that these additions should not be
expected to have much of an effect on the yield of
capital.’9 Another reason, according to Knight, is
tm6
Daniel Throop Smith, “Is Deficit Spending Practical?” lIar-
yard Business Reciew (Autumn 1939), p. 38.
“No attemnpt is made to cite all of Knight’s articles on in-
terest and capital, but a sunimnary is contained in Frank H.
Knight, “Capital and Interest,” in Readings in the Theory
of Income Distribution, The American Economnie Association
(Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company, 1949), pp. 384-
417. The Knight case was suggested to the authors by \Vil-
ham Dewald of Ohio State University, hut he is absolved
of any responsibility for the particular analysis here.
‘~Thedifficulty of interpreting Knight’s writing is illustrated
by Friedrich A. Lutz, The Theory of Interest (Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Co., 1968), p. 104, where he intro-
(luces his chapter on Knight as follows:
It is msot easy to give amm exposition of Kniglmt’s theory
of capital and interest. Over a numnber of years Knight
devoted misany papers to the subject; and, as ammyomme
who ever attempted to wom-k his ‘vay through Knight’s
theory knoivs. these writings have passages which are
very difficult to understammcl and also, either apparently’
or really, cosmtradictory.
I°For a discussion of the relationship between stocks and
flows in the market for capital goods, see James C. Witte,
Jr., ‘‘The Microfoundations of the Social Investment Func-
tion,” The Journal of Politico! Economy (October 1963),
pp. 441-56.
To add to the confimsiomm relating to the interpretation of
Kmught’s writings, it should he msoted tlmat Knight (lid not
accept the three—part division of resources into land, labor
and capital. His interpretation, rather, was that anyone who
lbs control over productive capacity will employ any’ or all
sources in such a way as to mimaximiz.e the return for their
use. For ami amialysis that preserves this broad interpretation
of capital, see Milton Friedmamm, P-rice Theory: A Procisional
Test (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1962), pp.
244-63.
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that investment carries with it an investment in
knowledge, including research and development. As
a result, a declining marginal product of capital is
approximately offset by technological advances so
that an aggregate investment curve is drawn as nearly
horizontal with respect to the yield on capital.
When translated into an IS-LM frame of reference,
the Knight ease introduces an interesting element to
the crowding-out controversy. A perfectly fiat IS
curve (see Figure 3) means that fiscal actions are
incapable of shifting the IS curve. An increase in
Government spending, for example, absorbs saving
and reduces the amount available for private invest-
ment (any increase in Government spending shows
up as a one-for-one displacement of private invest-
ment). Combining the fiat IS curve with the LM
curve provides a case where monetary policy domin-
ates the determination of output. Fiscal actions
have no effect on either output or the interest rate.2°
It is of interest to note that monetary policy has no
effect on the interest rate either, an implication
which runs counter to some statements by Knight.2’
But because fiscal actions do not shift aggregate de-
mand for this so-called Knight case, the implication
is that both nominal and real crowding out occur.22
----Recently, Professors Paul David and John Scad-
ding developed some arguments for crowding out that
are derived from an assumption of ultrarationality on
the part of households,23 The notion of ultraration-
ality is based on the assumption that households re-
gard the corporate and Government sectors as exten-
sions of themselves — as instruments of their private
interests. This fundamental behavorial assumption is
ofiered as an explanation for Denison’s Law — the
20
1t is surprising that this case has not received mnore atten-
tion in the literature, because it is every bit as mnonetarist
as tIme vertical LM ease. For an example of one writer wlmo
does mnention this case, see Martin Bronfenbrenner, Income
Distribution Theory (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), pp,
339-40. However, Bronfemibrenner dismisses it as a long-m-un
case with little short—run significance.
2t
See Knight, “Capital and Interest,” p. 406.
~‘Though the Knight case has msot Iseen empirically tested, it
has implicatiomis which are consistemmt with the results ot a
nmnber of empirical studies. ‘The Andersen—lordan results
relating ehammges in CNP to -mnonetary and fiscal actions are
consistent with such a ease. The inability to find a stable
relationship between interest rates and various measures of
fiscal action is also consistemst. And finally, the stability of
real interest rates over time — at least to the extent real
rates have been nmeasured — provides indirect evidence in
support of the Knight model.
2
t
Paul A. David and John L. Seadding, “Private Savings:
Ultrarationahity, Aggregation, amsd ‘Dcnisou’s Law,’ ‘‘ Journal






observed stability of the ratio of gross private saving
to GNP in tile United States.2’m
The David-Scadding article is of relevance to the
crowding-out controversy because of its fiscal policy
implications. The assumption of ultrarationality im-
plies displacement effects of Government spending
which the authors call “cx ante crowding out.” They
argue that stability of the gross private saving ratio
2~EdwardF. Denison, “A Note on Private Saving,” l’he Re-
view of Economics and Statistics (Augsmst 1958), pp. 261-67.
David and Scadding suggest that if Govemmnent and cor-
porate activity simply substitute for, rather than augment,
household activity, there should he virtually no change in
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in the face of substantial variation in the Government
deficit suggests that private debt and public debt
are close substitutes. An extra dollar of Government
deficit displaces a dollar of private investment ex-
penditure because deficit financing is viewed as pub-
lic investment and substitutes for private investment
in that households tend to classify both in terms of
future consumption benefits. This case is shown in
Figure 4, where an increase in Government spending
financed by borrowing induces an offsetting change
in private investment so that the IS curve does not
shift on balance.
Similarly, tax-financed expenditures have a dis-
placement effect on private consumption since they
are viewed in terms of their present consumption
benefits and substitute perfectly for private con-
sumption. With an increase in Government spending
for consumption financed by increased taxes, the in-
crease in taxes reduces private consumption with no
effect on private saving. As a result, there is a shift
in the composition of output from the private sector
to the Government, but there is no shift in aggregate
demand.
Consequently, \vith tax-financed Government ex-
penditures displacing private consumption and Gov-
ernment bond issues (deficit financing) displacing
private debt issues dollar for dollar, there is no way
that fiscal actions can affect total demand for goods
and services. In the parlance of the IS-LM framework,
fiscal actions (defined as either tax- or debt-financed
Government expenditures) have no net effect on the
IS curve or on aggregate demand, which implies both
nominal and real crowding out. Also, for this case,
fiscal actions have no influence on interest rates,
Whether the David-Scadding ultrarational case is
to be taken as a serious explanation of crowding out
is an open question. Yet it is important to note the
implications of this model, because it represents a
departure from the severe restrictions implicit in the
IS-LM model, In particular, tile IS-LM model allows
for no substitution between private spending and
public spending; David-Scadding have shown that
moving away from these restrictive assumptions
acts in the direction of reducing the fiscal policy
multipliers. Furthermore, by way of Denison’s Law,
they conclude that the evidence leans more toward
the extreme of ultrarationality than the extreme of
the IS-LM model.
~ f:~c-~ All
cases discussed thus far have not presented any con-






out issue, because aggregate demand typically does
not shift. There is, however, another way in which
crowding out might occur, reflecting a response of
the price level to a step-sip in Government spending.
This case argtres that crowding out is possible even
without tile assumption that aggregate demand does
not shift. Tile implication for nominal versus real
crowding out is ambiguous for this case, however,
Robert Rasche constructed a sophisticated version
of the IS-LM apparatus which was based primarily
on the textbook presentation of Robert Grouch.2°
25
Rohert H. Rasehe, ‘‘A Commmparative Static Analysis of Soame
\lonetarist Propositions,” this Review (December 1973), pp.
15-23; and Robert L. Crouelm Macroeconomics ( New York:
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The model included wealth in the consumption and
money demand functions, a Government budget con-
straint, and a labor sector, as well as an endogenous
price level. According to Rasche’s analysis, an in-
crease in real Government purchases, financed either
by taxes or debt issuance, increases aggregate de-
mand, and, consequently, the commodity price level.
Although there may also be a rise in consumption
owing to a presumed positive effect of debt issuance
on wealth, there is an offsetting increase in the
demand for money associated with such wealth gains
(see Figure 5). The rise in the price level reduces
private consumption as well as the real supply of
money. Together with a decline in the amount of
private investment owing to an increase in interest
rates, these factors tend to crowd out an amount of
real private expenditures equivalent to the increase
in Government purchases. Crowding out occurs in this
model in real terms, but with a higher price level,
crowding out is not likely to occur in nominal terms.
These results lead Rasehe to conclude that nominal
crowding out requires “extreme” assumptions about
the interest elasticity and the wealth elasticity of the
demand for real cash balances. It should he pointed
out, however, that Rasche, in his manipulation of the
model, did not ailow for a Keynes expectation effect,
an ultrarational direct substitution effect, or a Knight
effect, all of which may leave the aggregate demand
curve unmoved in response to an initial increase in
Government spending.
Milton Friedman’s role in the crowding-out con-
troversy was established in a series of articles pub-
lished in the Journal of Political Economy over the
period 1970 to 1972.20 Friedman did not rely solely
on the IS-LM model as a framework for his analysis,
hut most of his ideas can be summarized in such a
context. Friedman denied emphatically that the mone-
tarist propositions rested on the shape of the LM
locus. Instead, Friedman stressed the continuing ef-
fects of deficit finance, and a fundamental distinction
between stocks andflows.
Friedman dealt with a large number of complex
issues in his reply to the critics, and it is difficult to
determine to what extent he supported the notion of
fiscal crowding out. 1-lis chief point seems to have
~0Friedmnan, “Comnmnents on tile Critics”; “A Theoretical
Framework for Monetary Asmalysis,” Journal of Political
Economy (March/April 1970), pp. 193-238; and “A Mone-
tary Theory of Nomnirmal Income,” Journal of Political








been that the power of monetary actions far surpasses
that of fiscal actions, which is similar to but not quite
the same as declaring a belief in crowding out. Never-
theless, he concluded that the expansionary effect of
arm increase in Government spending by borrowing
is likely to be minor.
To illustrate the Friedman case, consider Figure 6.
The IS curve is drawn quite flat, reflecting Friedman’s
statement that “‘saving’ and ‘investment’ have to be
interpreted much more broadly than neo-Keynesians
tend to interpret it,...”27 Though Friedman does
not emphasize it, this interpretation puts him close to
the Knight case, because the implication of more
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inclusive investment tends to flatten the IS curve and
dampen the power of fiscal actions.
25 In addition,
Friedman indicates that the wealth effects of in-
creased bond holdings on spending will be minimal,
because increases in debt would tend to be offset by
an increase in expected tax liabilities.
Perhaps an even more important reason to doubt
the long-run expansive capacity of increased Govern-
ment spending is its effect on the future production
of goods and services. Friedman notes that debt-
supported Government spending leads to a “reduction
in the physical volume of assets created because of
lowered private productive investment.”29 In other
words, potential output in the future will be low-
ered relative to what it would otherwise be with the
transfer of resources from private investment (which
generates the future capital stock) to Government
spending (which absorbs the capital stock).
Apart from these objections to the idea of stimula-
tive Governmentactions, an initial shift of the IS curve
(see Figure 6) may still be consistent with crowding
out over the longer term, For a given LM curve, the
relatively flat IS curve, svhieh Friedman apparently
envisions, yields a shift of aggregate demand which
is very small. In addition, Friedman notes that “the
evidences of Government debt are largely in place of
evidences of private debt — people hold Treasury bills
instead of bills issued by, for example, U.S. Steel.”3°
If this statement is given the ultrarational interpreta-
tion discussed earlier, private expenditure is cut back,
thereby offsetting the initial increase in Government
spending. Whether such an effect is a partial or com-
plete offset is not made clear, hut if it exists, the IS
and aggregate demand curves move hack toward
their original positions.
These are the initial effects of a debt-financed in-
crease in Government spending, but Friedman goes
on to emphasize that subsequent effects will con-
tinue as long as a deficit exists. In later periods, the
IS curve will continue shifting hack to the left be-
cause private expenditures continue to he cut back
28
T. Norman Van Cott and Gary Sammtoni, ‘‘Friedman versus
Tobin: A Comment,” Journal of Political Economy (July!
August 1974), pp. 883-85, In this article the authors show
that the effect of broadening the interpretation of saving
and investment is to make the IS schedule flatter. They
demonstrate this by adding the interest rate asan argument
in the consumption function, and then showing that the
extent to which the IS curve is shifted is smnaffeeted by
fiscal actions; only the slope is changed.
29
Friedman, “Comments on the Critics,’ p. 917.
3~
Ibid,
as Government debt is substituted for private debt.
Eventually, the stock of private wealth will be re-
duced relative to what it otherwise would be because
of reduced investment, thereby reinforcing the left-
ward movement of the IS curve.31
Because Friedman is not clear with regard to the
role of commodity prices in his analysis, it is difficult
to assess his view of real versus nominal crowding out.
It is perhaps best simply to conclude that the im-
pact of an increase in debt-financed Government
spending is very small, and that there is little differ-
ence between the effects of debt- versus tax-financed
expenditure. A relatively flat IS curve yields these
.tmFor a recent paper that works Out a numerical example of
the first round and subsequent effects of a fiscal action in
an lS-LM framework, see Laurence H. Meyer, “The Bal-
ance Sheet Identity, The Government Financing Constraint,
and the Crowding-Out Effect,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
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results, and any ultrarational effects would reinforce
them.
:wJ(~ fifld
The Friedman emphasis on the longer-run effects
of monetary and fiscal actions prompted two major
papers (one by Alan Blinder and Robert Solow and
the other by James Tobin and Willem Buiter) that
attempted to demonstrate that the crowding-out ef-
fect of fiscal actions is not consistent with the assump-
tion of stability of the economic system, as repre-
sented by the IS-LM model.52 Both of these papers
are discussed in this section along with a third —b y
Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer — which actually
antedates the other two.33 All three models essentially
employ comparative static tools to examine a dynamic
phenomenon.
Ide .1. lid Ud. ~
Blind’ nnd dsinn: Recently, Blinder and Solow
developed a rigorous theoretical attack on the cro\vd-
ing-out thesis.3~They envisioned three possible levels
of crowding out:
1) The Government undertakes activities which
would otherwise be provided, on a one-for-one basis,
by the private sector. They point out that this sort of
crowding out (to time extemlt it exists) would occur
regardless of 110w the Government spending was
financed;
2) Debt issues floated by the Government to fi-
nance its spending drive up interest rates and crowd
out privatehorrowing;
3) Increases in wealth, derived from the issuance
of Govermnent bonds, increase money demand, that
is, shift the LM curve leftward sufficiently to negate
the rightward shifts of the IS curve.
Blinder-Solow constructed an extended version of
the IS-LM framework which incorporated consump-
~ii3lismder aimd Solow, ‘‘Does Fiscal Policy Matter?” and Tohiu
and Baiter, ‘Lommg Run Effects.”
:nsl3mjmner and Meitzer, “Money, Debt, mmmd Economic
Activity,” tm4
For papers criticizing the Blinder-Solow analysis, see Albert
Ando, ‘Ssmme Aspects of Stalsilization Policies, The Mone—
tarist Controversy, and time MPS Model,” International Eco-
nomic Reciew (October 1974), pp . 541—71; Paul E, Ssnith,
‘‘Time Covem’nment Budget Constraismt, Crowding Out, and
Stability of Equilibrium,” unpublished (May 1975); and
ames it, Barth, Jammmes T, Benmiett, and Richard H. Sines,
‘‘Fiscal Policy and Macroeeomsomnic Activity,’ ( Paper pre—
seuted at tIme Meetings (mf the Sontherms Econonmie Associa—
tiomm, New Orleans, Louisiana, November 14, 1.975).
tion and money demand as functions of wealth, and
a Government budget constraint providing for Gov-
ernment debt interest payments. They adhered to the
usual IS-LM customs of treating the price level as
fixed and of ignoring the existence of a banking
system.
Blinder-Solow then attempted to discern the likeli-
hood of crowding-out phenomena occurring by in-
vestigating the stabihty properties of the model. They
derived the following theoretical conclusions:
1) if Government spending financed by bond issu-
ance is confractionary, as (according to Blinder-Solow)
monetarists claim, the IS-LM model is unstable;
2) if Government spending financed by bond issu-
ance is expansive, as neo-Keynesians claim, but less
expansive than Governnient spending financed by
money creation, the model is unstable;
3) if Government spending financed by bond issu-
ance is more expansive than Government spending
financed by money creation, the model is stable.
The unusual result that theoretical stability condi-
tions imply that bond-financed Government spending
is more stimulative than money-financed Government
spending comes about because of the inclusion of
interest payments on outstanding debt in the Gov-
ernment budget constraint. For the model to be stable,
the budget must be in balance in the long run to
ensure unchanging stocks of money and debt. In or-
der for the budget gap to close after the initial shock
of fiscal stimulus, income must rise by a larger amount
in the bond-financed case than in the money-financed
case. This result follows because higher tax receipts
must be induced to offset the increased interest pay-
muents on the Government debt.
Bndr~ Recently Tobin and Buiter also
formulated an IS-LM model for the purpose of ex-
amining the crowding-out thesis. Although some of
the eqnations differ from those employed by Blinder-
Solow, the basic assumptions, such as a constant price
level, and the methodology, which is marked by the
stability requirement of a balanced budget process,
are virtually the same.3°Like Blinder-Solow, Tobin-
Buiter utilized more than one variation of the basic
IS-LM model, and like Blinder-Solow, they arrived at
the conclusion that the stability considerations inher-
ent in the balanced budget requirement generate a
~~Altlmommgh the bulk of their analysis assuumes a constant price
level, as does nml earlier smmodel on which their paper was
i,ased, Tohin—Buiter present one version of the model which
emmmploys a variable price level.
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positive Government spending multiplier. Tohin-
Buiter emphasized that the analysis is conducted for
periods in which the economy is less than fully em-
ployed. Furthermore, that crowding out occurs at
full employment is, for them, not a foregone con-
clusion, in view of a positive fiscal multiplier in their
full-employment model.
‘, H’. ‘ Another model has recently
been developed which is adaptable to analysis of the
crowding-out question. Brunner and Meltzer con-
sfructed a model of the economy which differs sig-
nificantly in orientation from the standard IS-LM
model. The Brunner-Meltzer model contains markets
for real assets, financial assets, and current output, and
permits wealth owners to choose among money, bonds,
real capital and current expenditures. In contrast
with the Blinder-Solow and basic Tobin-Buiter mod-
els, the Brunner-Meltzer model permits the price
level to be determined endogenously and includes a
banking sector. The analysis also features, as do the
other models, stability considerations and a Govern-
ment sector which issues interest-bearing debt.
Apparently, these common elements of the models
are the elements which lead to the unusual results
already noted in the Blinder-Solow model, and which
also emerge in the Brunner-Meltzer model. In par-
ticular, Brunner-Meltzer find that Government spend-
ing financed by debt issuance is more stimulative than
Government spending accompanied by expansionary
monetary actions. Such a result is again dictated by
the requirement of a balanced budget for long-run
equilibrium. Once disturbed by, say, an increase in
Government spending, the budget is required to re-
turn to balance, and the presence of interest pay-
ments in the budget constraint means that a larger
increase in income is required for bond-financing
than for money financimmg.
Brunner-Meltzer recognized this obvious discrep-
ancy between their model results and the historical
evidence, particularly as interpreted by monetarists,
They note, that their model results imply “that infla-
tion or deflation can occur without any change in B
[the monetary base, which is the prime determinant
of the money supp1y].’~~ Bnmnner and Meltzer take
a markedly different view of the causes of inflation
outside their model construct and in the context of
observable phenomena: “Our analysis of inflation, pre-
sented at the Universities-National Bureau Gonfer-
ence on Secular Inflation, analyzes the issue in more
36
Bmnner amid Meitzer, “Money, Deht, amid Economic Activ-
ity,” p. 973 (bracketed words supplied).
detail and explains why most inflations or deflations
have resulted from changes in money.”37
One must bear in mind that the results of the
Brunner-Meltzer model are predicated on: (1) the
absence of money illusion (in the usual sense), but
the existence of a possible wealth illusion by way of
incomplete, discounting of future tax liabilities; (2)
the requirement of a balanced budget; (3) a fixed
capital stock (Blinder-Solow, in contrast, present a
variation of their model in which the capital stock is
permitted to grow); (4) no labor sector (to facilitate
changes in output in lieu of the absence of a changing
capital stock); and (5) the presumption that asset
prices respond more strongly to an increase in Govern-
ment debt than to an increase inthe monetarybase.~~
The recent attack on the crowding-out thesis by
way of stability analysis introduces a new element
into the controversy. There are several reasons to
to question the implications of these models of the
economy which indicate that crowding out is not con-
sistent with model stability.
B ~“ ‘:,‘,~ i~nn’~:”~’ The Blinder-
Solow model and the basic Tobin-Buiter model, which
are somewhat sophisticated versions of the standard
IS-LM apparatus, pci-mit no role for price level
changes.~° Considering world-wide economic devel-
opments over the past decade, one must question the
relevance of so-called “structural” models which omit
the existence of inflationary pressures and inflationary
expectations. Moreover, an important channel through
which crowding out might occur is closed off when
price level changes are forbidden to emerge.
Blinder-Solow recognized this deficiency of their
model to some extent, as indicated by their acknowl-
edgement that the fiscal policy multiplier would be
lowered in several ways by the inclusion of an en-
dogenously-determined price level: (1) higher prices





The last—nmemmtiormed itesmi is particularly critical for time
iirunmmer-Meltzer results. \Vhereas asset prices can he ex-
pectedl to respond imi a positive maminer to increases in the
mosmetary base, there is’amnbiguity in the respoimse of asset
prices to the issuance of Covernmnermt debt, A positive
wealth effect ( givems immeommmplete diseountimmg of future tax
liai,ihties ) mnust outweigh a mmegative suhstitutiomm effect
(caused hy (kmvernnment debt cosnpeting ism asset markets
with private debt) for time Bnmjmner-Moitzer results to hold.
:sOThe Brunner-Meltzer mnodel permits price level flexibility,
hut excludes a labor sector, which presumnahly plays an
important part in realistic attemupts to capture time econonmic
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LM curve to the left; (2) higher prices reduce real
wealth, and thus consumption, shifting the IS curve
to the left; (3) progressive taxes combined with in-
flation increase the real yield of the tax system, which
also tends to shift the IS curve leftward; (4) a rising
price level depresses exports and induces imports in
an open economy, which again pushes the IS curve
to the left.4°
Blinder-Solow maintained that although the fiscal
multiplier will be less than before with the inclusion
of price level changes, the sign of the multiplier will
remain positive. Because it is their view that the
crowding-out hypothesis requires the fiscal multiplier
to be negative, the authors considered only the sign
of the coefficient to be at issue. This, however, is a
gross exaggeration. To our knowledge, there have been
no claims that the crowding-out hypothesis requires
that a dollar of Government spending, unsupported
by monetary expansion, must reduce private spend-
ing by ‘more than a dollar, which is the implication
of a negative fiscal policy multiplier,41 Crowding out
of the private sector occurs not only when $1 of Gov-
ernment spending reduces private spending by $1
(a multiplier of zero), but when $1 of Government
spending reduces private spending by 50 cents (a
multiplier of 0.50). Crowding out, then, is a matter
of degree rather than of absolute magnitudes. A
negative multiplier is not a necessary condition for
crowding out. And the omission of changing price
levels in various IS-LM models contributes to the
likelihood that crowding out tendencies will not
emerge.
The three models
under consideration show that in order for the budget
to be balanced, and for the model to be in long-run
equilibrium, the fiscal policy multiplier must be posi-
tive, A full equilibrium requires that the levels of
stocks and flows be unchanging. But the question re-
mains, how does such a formal analysis contribute to
an explanation of the empirical results that imply
crowding out occurs?
Tobin-Buiter made two significant points in this
connection, First, they questioned the ability of eco-
nomic analysis — presumably, as incorporated in ab-
stract models — to track changing economic variables
to some logical end. “The trouble with such discus-
40
Blinder-Soiow added this final price effect in “Analytical
Fommndations of Fiscal Policy,” in Alan S. Blinder, Robert
M. Solow, et ai., The Economics of Public Finance (Wash-
ington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 47.
~Ut should be pointed out that various econometric models
indeed have uncovered negative fiscal mnultipliers (see p.14
of this article).
sions, including this one, is that a long run constructed
to track the ultimate consequences of anything is a
never-never land. For that abstraction we apologize
in advance.”42 If one is really interested in tracking
changes in economic variables over time, the better
approach would be to construct dynamic models
rather than comparative static models.
Second, Tobin-Buiter questioned the stability re-
quirements (including a balanced budget) associated
with the IS-LM investigations into the crowding-out
controversy. Their concluding remarks were:
Finally, we observe again that it is disturbing that
the qualitative properties of models — the signs of
important system-wide multipliers, the stability of
equilibria — can turn on relatively small changes of
specification or on small differences in values of
coefficients. We do not feel entitled to use the
‘correspondence principle’ assumption of stability to
derive restrictions on structural equations and pa-
rameters. There is no divine guarantee that the
economic system is stable,43
The economic system may be stable in the sense
that the U.S. economy has not exploded, but it is a
long jump from that sort of stability to one which
requires stock-flow equilibrium including a balanced
budget. Indeed, the budget of the U.S. Government
has been in deficit in eleven of the past fifteen years.
The stock-flow equilibrium models discussed here,
then, are basically empty of empirical content. Al-
though there may have been periods in which some
of the relevant flows were approximately in balance,
one would be hard pressed to uncover data points
corresponding to periods of unchanging stocks. With-
out the necessary data and a translation of the ab-
stract models in a form which is testable, it is impos-
sible to confirm or refute the hypotheses associated
with these stock-flow equilibrium models.
The underlying as-
sumptions and stability requirements of the models
in question combine to produce a most curious result:
Government spending financed by debt issuance is
more expansionary than Government spending ac-
companied by money creation, The expansionary ef-
fect is summarized in terms of real output in the
Blinder-Solow model and prices in the Brunner-Melt-
zer model,
These theoretical implications run contrary to vir-
tually every investigation conducted into the impacts
of fiscal and monetary policy actions on economic
42
Tobin and Buiter, “Long Run Effects,” p. 1.
~~Ibid., p. 42 (italics supplied).
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activity. None of the architects of these models at-
tempted to reconcile the model implications with the
mass of empirical studies contradicting them.
Brunner and Meltzer acknowledged this discrep-
ancy. Hlowever, they offered no explanation for the
fact that even though their model implies that bond-
financed Government spending is more inflationary
than money-financed spending, their own empirical
studies indicate just the opposite.44 One is led to
conclude that manipulation of these theoretical mod-
els constitutes an interesting academic exercise, hut
contributes little of practical significance to the crowd-
ing out controversy. With empirical considerations
coming to the fore, the discussion now turns to the
econometric literature to determine what evidence
that approach lmas brought to bear on the issue of
crowding out.
~ i.~’Li,.),’t,’t~~1B~.
In a recent study of a number of econometric
models, Gary Fromm and Lawrence Klein published
simulation results showing the implied Government
expenditure and tax mulitpliers for these models.45
The results showed long-run Government spending
multipliers ranging from about 1 to 5 when measured
in terms of impact on current dollar GNP.4° How-
ever, the majority of the large models surveyed re-
vealed that crowding out did occur in real terms over
time. Some indicated $1 of Government spending for
goods and services crowded out even more than $1 of
private spending.
For example. the Wharton Mark III Model yielded
a multiplier of minus 3 after forty quarters, and the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. Department of
Comn’merce) Model gave a real Government spending
Karl Bm’uoaer, Miehele Fratianoi, Jerry L. Jordan, Allan II.
Meitzer, and Manfred J, Neumarmn, “Fiscal and Monetary
Policies in Moderate inflation: Case Stuches of Three Coumm—
tries,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (February
1973), pp. 313-53.
45
Cary Fromm and Lawrence R. Klein, “A Comparisomm of
F:leven Econoimietrie Models of the United States,” The
American Ecoimomic Review (May 1973j, pp. 385-93, These
models, unlike the IS-LM abstractions discussed earlier,
~vere not forced to a fuli stock—flow equilibrium.
4 °Bliimd em—Solow cited these results as attesting to the absence
of crowding out in large incoimie—expendittmre oodels. Ac-
knowledging the imonexisteoce of Covernmnent hudget eon—
straiimts in the msmodels, they added that despite this de-
fieiermcy, “All we can do now is render a verdict orm the
basis of the evidemmce already in.” They ignored the real
crowding—out results implied by the econometric smiodels,
which is smmrpnisimmg, in that their own mmmodei emmmphasized the
crowding-out issue in real terms. See Blinder and Solo’v,
“Analytical Foundations,” p. 78.
multiplier over the same time period of minus 23.
These results go well beyond monetarists’ contentions
that complete crowding out gives a multiplier of ap-
proximately zero, though these results are less than
clear on the issue of nominal crowding out.
The Fromm-Klein survey of the empirical results
suggested that crowding out typically occurred be-
cause of a rising price level, capacity constraints, and
rising nominal interest rates. These results are con-
sistent with those implied by the extended IS-LM
case described above, and do not necessarily cor-
roborate crowding out of the nonshifting aggregate
demand variety, that is, those cases which imply
that crowding out occurs because fiscal actions are off-
set by other components of aggregate demand.
However, Fromm-Klein recognized that the model
simulations produced evidence not in accord with the
usual standard Keynesian presumption of positive
Government spending multipliers:
Conventional textbook expositions generally depict
real expendittmre mncmltipliers approaching positive
asymptotes. In fact, most of the models here show
such mnultipliers reaching a peak in two or three years
and then declining thereafter in fluctuating paths.
At the end of five to ten years, some of the models
show that eontirnmed sustained fiscal stimulus has
ever-increasing perverse impacts.47
Klein suggested elsewhere that perlmaps these new
estimates of the fiscal multiplier are not as damaging
to the Keynesian position as they initially appear.48
After all, it takes a considerable length of time in
some of the models for the Government spending
mnultiplier to approach zero or turn negative, and
polieymakers historically have shown little concern
for the long run. We would only add that this argu-
nient reflects ~he progression of the debate on crowd-
ing out from “Does it exist?” to “What is the time
period?”
As far as small niodels are concerned, the monetarist
model of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis set
off much of the current controversy. Fiscal crowding
out emerges in the reduced form equations published
in the St. Louis Review only after a period of time,
even though it is a much shorter period of time than
that of the large income-expenditure models, and it
occurs in nominal terms rather than in just real terms.
(;ovci~mentspending, as measured by high-employ-
ment expenditures, exercises a relatively strong in-
‘
mT
Frt,nim and Klein, “A Comnparisoim,’’ p. 393 (italics suppheci
45
See La’vremmce R. Klein, “Conlmentarv on ‘1’he State of the
Mouetanist Debate,’” this Review (September 1873), pp.
9-12.
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fluence on GNP (assuming a constant change in the
money supply) in the current quarter and the next
quarter, hut is approximately offset within a year’s
time.
These results, which are confirmed by regression
analysis employing data through mid-1975, should not
be interpreted to suggest that “Government spending
doesn’t matter”; it matters very much over a certain
period. Moreover, if Government spending were to
accelerate or decelerate rapidly rather than be held
to a steady rate of change, the impact on GNP would
be considerable,
The chief reason that these reduced form results
are of interest is that they do not follow from a
structural model that constrains the channels of trans-
mission from fiscal actions to economic activity. Gov-
ernment expenditures cover a wide range of activities,
some of which substitute for private consumption and
investment, and others which serve as substitutes or
complements to private factors of production.4°With
such diverse effects, any model which restricts the
transmission of fiscal actions to income and/or interest
rate channels, runs the risk of missing the full effects
of Government interaction with the private sector.°°
Time St. Louis results certainly do not do justice to the
measurement of the effects of the complexities of the
Government spending process, but they serve the
function of questioning the results from models which
restrict the operation of fiscal actions via fixed
channels.
/
This article has surveyed the recent literature on
the subject of the crowding-out effect of fiscal actions.
Crowding out was defined as a steady state Govern-
ment spending multiplier of near zero, a definition
which was extended to differentiate the terms “nom-
inal” and “real” crowding out.
~°We, like most other anaiysts, have had littie to say about
the effect of fiscal actions on aggregate supply. For an
attempt to enrich standard macroeconomic analysis with
such considerations, see Kenneth J. An’ow arid Mordeeai
Kurz, Public Investment, the Rate of Return, and Optimal
Fiscal Policy (Baltimore: The Johmms Hopkins Press, 1970);
and Lowell E. Galloway ammd Pamml F. Smith, ‘The Covenm-
ment Budget Constraint and Aggregate Supply,” (Paper
presented at the Meetings of the Southern Economnie Asso—
eiatioxm, New Om’leans, Lomn’sinmia, November 14, 1975).
5
°SeeII. 1,. llasmann, ‘‘Remarks Concerning the Applieatiomm
of Exact Firmite Sample Distrihution Functions for CCL
Estimators in Eccmnonmetrie Statistical inference,” Journal
of the American Statistical Association (December 1963),
p. 944, where he says:
the entire burden ofstatistical inference in econo-
metric simultaneosms equatiomms models falls on the un—
This survey indicates that the controversy has taken
place on two fronts — theoretical and empirical. First,
the theoretical literature has developed primarily with
reference to the IS-LM model or modifications thereof,
Several cases were examined which serve as candi-
dates providing theoretical support for the crowding-
out hypothesis. In addition, the role of stability con-
ditions in the crowding-out controversy was examined.
In general, the conclusion was that stability considera-
tions are of limited relevance with respect to the ac-
ceptance or rejection of the crowding-out hypothesis.
The empirical literature, on the other hand, has
taken the form of simulations of Government actions
and has yielded results that show signs of being con-
sistent with the crowding-out hypothesis. This crowd-
ing out tends to be very slow in developing, however,
and occurs in real rather than nominal terms. The St.
Louis results still stand out relative to the large
econometric models in that crowding out occurs more
quickly and also in nominal terms.
As a result of this survey, it is clear that the
crowding-out controversy continues to exist. Appar-
ently these issues will not approach resolution until
additional structural models are developed and tested,
The Keynesians have developed many models, but
these models have not been tested as interdependent
units.51 Monetarists, on the other hand, have not of-
fered structural models to go along with their reduced
form results,52 Such a turn toward hypothesis testing
could lead toward a resolution of the issues in the
crowding-out controversy. Although the controversy
has been explored in this article primarily on a theo-
retical level, the implications of these issues for practi-
cal matters of stabilization policy are of great
significance,
constrained estimates and test statistics associated with
the m’edueed-fonmm, at least, if empinicah confirmatiosm
of the underlying economic postulates is the goal aimed
at. Whenever the tmnconstnained reduced-fonn statistics
are judged to he in good agreement with the propo-
sitions (theorems) dedcmeed fromn the umlderlying ceo—
nouue postulates, then do the structural estimates
emerge as sound nmmd comivenient summaries of that
part of the sample statistical information which is
relevant to the numerical values of stnmetural pa-
rameters, but generally not othenvise.
amSee Keith M. Carlson, ‘‘Monetary ammd Fiscal Actions in
Macroeconomic Models,” this Review (January 1974), pp.
8-18, A suggested testing of mnodels as interdependent
immmits requires that the muodel be specified in structural formn,
but the testing of the model should focus on the reduced
form. For further discussion of this approach, see James L.
Murphy, Introductory Econometrics (Hom~mewood, illinois:
Richard 1). Irwin, Inc., 1973).
52
For recent efforts in this direction, however, see Leonall
C. Ammdersen, “A Monetary Model of Nominal Income
Determnination,” this Review (Jumie 1975), pp. 9-19.
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For purposes of definition consider the accompanying
Figure, panel (A), which is a representation of the
market for total output of goods and services. The
intersection of aggregate supply (AS0) and demand
(ADo) determine the equilibriimm level of output, Xo,
and the price. Po. at which it will be sold. Label this
intersection as point A and interpret it as an initial
equilibrium. Now, introduce an expansionary fiscal
action like increased Government demand for goods
and services financed by sales of Government debt
to time public.
Assume that the net effect of increased Government
demand and the issuance of debt is an increased de-
mand for goods and services, as indicated by the shift
of the demand curve to ADm. Further, suppose that
the expanded Government sector adversely affects
efficiency and productive capacity, resulting in a shift
of the simpply curve to AS. If the new equilibrium
occurs’ anywhere on the vertical line through point A,
say at poiimt B, we say that real crowding out has
ocetmrred. That is, increased real Government spending
has been completely offset by a decline in real private
spending.
Consider no’v Panel (B) in the Figure. The curved
line drawn through point A is a rectangular hyperbola
indicating that P times X, which is defined as the
nominal value of total onmtput (that is, GNP) , is con-
stant and equal to Po Xo. In other words, there is an
infimmite iumimmber of combinations of P and X, besides Po
and Xo, which would give the same dollar x-alue of
total output as at point A. Suppose that in response
to an expansionary fiscal actiomi, aggregate demand
ammd aggregate supply shift in various directions (de-
pending on the assumptions made) and the new
equilibriunm settles on the curved hue, say at point B
or C. Under these conditions, nominal crowding out
is said to occur. That is, an increase in Co’ernment
spemlding has been offset by a decline in time dollar
amount of spending by the private sector,
This distinction between nominal and real crowd-
ing out is important because eleamiy one does not im-
ply the other. This is shown, in Panel (C) which
eombines the definitions of real and nominal crowd-
ing out from Panel (A) and (B). The solid lines are not
demamld and supply curves, but are the loei of points
defining neal and nominal crosvding out.
Note that the lines are now drawn as the midpoint
of a shaded band. This is done to reflect the crowding-
out hypothesis; that is, an increase in Government
demand, not supported by monetary expansion, re-
sults in a steady state income multiplier of approxi-
mately zero. The middle of these bands represents
those points at which $1 of Government spending
crowds out exactly $1 of private spending. The shad-
imlg to the right of either line describes that area in
which partial crowding out (a multiplier between 0
and +1) occurs; the shading to the left of either line
describes that area in which over crowding out (a
multiplier between 0 and —1) occurs, Of course, it is
possible that a dollar of Government spending might
crowd out more than two dollars of private spending,
resulting in a multiplier of less than —1 and an equilib-
riunl point to the left of either of the bands.
Various combinations of real and nominal crowd-
ing out are possible, given an expansionary fiscal ac-
tioml. For example, at point A, there is partial nominal
ammd partial real crowding out. At point B, there is
partial mmominal, but over real crowding out and so on
for other eomhimlations imi’oimnd the intersection of the
two bands. At some point outside this area, such as
point E, there is partial real crowding out, hut a com-
plete absence of any sort of nominal crowding (lilt. It
is clear that a complete analysis of the fiscal process
requires amm assessnment uf both the demand and sup-
ply factors involved in order to describe accurately
the extent to which nominal and real crowding out
might occur.
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Definitions of Crowding Out
(A)
Real Crowding Out
AD0
x
P
P0
(B)
Nominal Crowding Out
Nominal
Crowding OUt
P
AS1
AD1
P0
•AS1
AD
AS2
Px=POxO
(C)
P
Summary
Real
Crowding Out
C
A
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